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Approaching the centenary of its establishment as a formal discipline, International Relations today challenges 
the ahistorical and aspatial frameworks advanced by the theories of earlier luminaries. Yet, despite a burgeoning 
body of literature built on the transdisciplinary efforts bridging International Relations and its long-separated 
nomothetic relatives, the new and emerging conceptual frameworks have not been able to effectively overcome 
the challenge posed by the ‘non-West’. The recent wave of international historical sociology has highlighted 
possible trajectories to problematise the myopic and unipolar conceptions of the international system; however, 
the question of Eurocentrism still lingers in the developing research programmes. This article interjects into the 
ongoing historical materialist debate in international historical sociology by: (1) conceptually and empirically 
challenging the rigid boundaries of the extant approaches; and (2) critically assessing the postulations of recent 
theorising on ‘the international’, capitalist states-system/geopolitics and uneven and combined development. 
While the significance of the present contributions in international historical sociology should not be 
understated, it is argued that the ‘Eurocentric cage’ still occupies a dominant ontological position which 
essentially silences ‘connected histories’ and conceals the role of inter-societal relations in the making of the 
modern states-system and capitalist geopolitics. 
Human history is like palaeontology. Owing to a certain judicial blindness even the best intelligences 
absolutely fail to see the things which lie in front of their noses. Later, when the moment has arrived, 
we are surprised to find traces everywhere of what we failed to see. (Marx, 1965: 140) 
If one were to recapitulate the mercurial disciplinary history of international relations (IR) 
today, a cynical voice could claim—with an interpretive license from Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels—that ‘the history of all hitherto existing IR theories is the history of 
unfulfilled promises’. This rather bold, if a bit melodramatic declaration is certainly an 
overstatement, yet it is not an empty one given the proclamations of the discipline’s ‘failure 
as an intellectual project’ (Buzan and Little, 2001) have gained common currency. Indeed, 
contemporary IR still struggles with a number of profound challenges posed by previous 
generations, ranging from the chronic ahistoricism and state-centrism of its structural variants 
to the multiplex forms of autocentrisms which continue to haunt a vast palette of its 
conceptual approaches. Facing up to some, but not all, of these challenges, the discipline has 
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variously crafted crucial ‘fixes’ and made several radical ‘turns’ towards critical approaches. 
One such attempt to reorient theoretical and ontological underpinnings has been the so-called 
‘historical turn’, a multifaceted cross-disciplinary effort aimed at situating historical evidence 
and exposition at the heart of theory construction, derivation and verification. IR’s initial 
engagement and its ensuing synthesis with historical sociology materialised within the 
parameters of this historical turn and it was thus welcomed as a necessary move to eliminate 
the shortcomings of what has often been referred to as the statist, ahistorical conundrum of its 
mainstream theorising. This ‘necessity’ to historicise metatheoretical assumptions and 
exorcise mechanistic determinations had become so exigent that one scholar exclaimed that 
‘the discipline’s future rests upon coming to terms with these new [historical] sociological 
arguments’ (Jarvis 1989: 291). Hence international historical sociology (IHS) emerged as an 
antidote to different modes of homogenising and selectively historicist tendencies in the 
discipline, ranging from neorealist IR’s ‘historicism of stasis’ which ‘freezes the political 
institutions of the current world order’ (Ashley, 1984: 257) to international political 
economy’s ‘fever of naturalizing the present and viewing the past through the lens of the 
present’ (Seabrooke, 2007: 396).  Much like the historical sociology literature from which it 2
drew major methodological and analytical frameworks, inaugural works in the commencing 
IHS literature were dominated by a Weberian allegiance to methodological pluralism. Yet the 
promise of the ‘second wave’ lost its place to a new ‘third wave’ in little over a decade, as the 
mounting theoretical pressure on the Weberian project shifted the objective of IHS away from 
a mere ‘injection’ of history and necessitated ‘a sociological explanation and account of how 
the international system has always taken a pluralistic form’ (Hobson, 2011: 150). 
 The term International Historical Sociology is associated most directly with Fred Halliday’s contributions, but 2
has also been criticised for reifying the nationalist bias of classical sociology which ‘carries epistemological 
connotations and limits . . . that require denationalization’ (Teschke, 2011: 1106). While Teschke’s call for a 
redefinition from international historical sociology to ‘social history of spatial relations’ correctly highlights the 
limitations of Halliday’s project—‘to produce a sociology at once historical and international’ (Halliday 2002: 
245 original emphasis)—this article employs the IHS designation to signal the crucial position the ‘international’ 
occupies in analysing the trajectory of long-term, multi-scalar developments.
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 The aim of this paper is not to provide an overview of or to problematise the whole 
emerging corpus in this so called ‘third wave’, but to specifically challenge the vestiges of 
Eurocentrism in its Marxist wing.  I argue that despite the development of promising new 3
research programmes in Marxist IHS such as Justin Rosenberg’s overhaul of uneven and 
combined development or the various adaptations of Robert Brenner’s social property 
relations approach, there is still a ‘disciplinary silence’ (Bhambra, 2007: 149) on the role of 
the non-West in the emergence, mechanisms and transformation of ‘the international’. The 
closing gap between postcolonial theory and Marxist approaches as well as the development 
of Marxist frameworks focusing on ‘inter-societal’ relations have dispelled this silence to a 
certain extent, yet as the following discussion reveals, Eurocentrism in IHS is persistent and 
can imbue even prima facie non-Eurocentric forms of theorising. 
 I define Eurocentrism as a form of autocentric material and knowledge production 
sustained by several narratives including: 
1. An ex post facto hypothesis that modern socio-economic development is an exclusively 
endogenous European affair and that the components of this trajectory can be found 
unanimously within a geographically and culturally defined Europe (and in general the 
West). 
2. A provincialist intertwinement of social theory and historiography maintaining that the 
‘[i]deas of the State, sovereignty, secularism, nationalism, citizenship, civil society . . . are 
drawn from the European experience with negligible or non-existent contact with 
Europe’s others and their organizing logics’ (Pasha, 2009: 536). 
3. A paternalistic theory of history defending the universal validity of the European 
trajectory and the ultimate necessity for others to imitate the same experience. 
 For critiques of and interventions in Eurocentric IR theorising, see, most recently Bhambra (2011); Hobson 3
(2012); Sabaratnam (2011); Seth (2011) and Vasilaki (2012).
#3
4. A persistent dismissal of the significance of global interconnections between social forces 
across time and space which then results in: 
4.1. The eradication of the role and effect of the non-West in engendering both 
conjunctural and epochal transformations, some of which are essentially 
constitutive of the emergence of the modern capitalist economy and the 
international states-system. 
4.2. The removal of a number of global events and processes from the analytical 
discussion, intentionally or unintentionally serving the ‘whitewashing all of 
Europe’s sins’ (Wallerstein, 1997: 102), including colonialism and imperialism. 
In Marxist IHS, the Eurocentric substratum that permeates the conceptual discussions and 
distorts the ways in which the historical evidence is extracted does not necessarily stem from 
a concentrated effort to replicate a ‘European miracle’ discourse, nor does it emerge as a 
result of being locked in a form of methodological nationalism, but from the complete 
absence of the non-West in theoretical frameworks as an active agent of the global history of 
socio-economic development. Accordingly, the non-West does not even get discarded from 
the narrative since it was never included in the first place. Borrowing the term from Adam 
Morton (2013: 133), I describe this social, historical and geographical lacuna in the literature 
as an ‘ontological exteriority’ through which the rest of the world is either completely read off 
or extrapolated only as a comparative utility to prioritise or underscore the European 
experience. Thus in much of Marxist IHS, the dislocation of the non-West from a reciprocal 
agential axis is not necessarily a deliberate move on the scholars’ part, but is a form of what 
John M. Hobson calls ‘subliminal Eurocentrism’ (2007: 93), an often unconsciously 
maintained template that survives due to the very non-existence of the extra-European world 
in the foundational elements of established theories. The challenge for Marxist IHS then is to 
re-interiorise the non-West and incorporate it back into the most fundamental theoretical 
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discussions regarding the conditions of multilinear socio-economic development that can 
provide a comprehensive causal map of ‘diachronic intersocietal unity’, i.e. the international 
(Shanin, 1983: 18). 
 The argument unfolds through a brief review of the social property relations approach. 
I maintain that Robert Brenner’s theory of social property relations cannot form the basis of 
an internationalist theory as it operates on an extremely particularistic conception of social 
change which fails both to explain coeval processes in the rest of the world and to offer 
analytical tools to integrate the non-West into his strictly ‘Anglocentric’ theory. Subsequently, 
the argument is expanded to scrutinise whether similar factors are visible in the recent 
discussions on the nature of the ‘modern’ international system, geopolitics and capitalism’s 
relationship with the states-system. Here the focus is on two significant contributions from 
Benno Teschke (2003) and Hannes Lacher (2006), both of whom have developed intricate re-
interpretations of the states-system, sovereignty and territoriality in capitalism by utilising 
Brenner’s theory of social property relations. While offering a number of innovative 
arguments and compelling revisions on the development of the European states-system, the 
Political Marxism of Teschke and Lacher is equally imbued with a stringent conception of the 
history of capitalism and the modern states-system within which their origins, development 
and expansion are predominantly explained through an exclusively European lens. This in 
turn creates an extremely internalist perspective wherein the ‘international’ becomes 
necessarily subjugated to an ‘inter-European’ position. 
 Following the critique of Political Marxism, the article then moves on to the analysis 
of one of the most important recent contributions in the field, namely Justin Rosenberg’s re-
conceptualisation of Leon Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development (U&CD). 
Rosenberg’s intervention promises a potential resolution to the Eurocentric woes of the 
discipline as it aims to construct a general theory of inter-societal relations in the form of the 
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‘international’. Theorising the international thus would solve the discipline’s perennial 
problem by postulating the ways in which the process of uneven and combined development 
has historically created a ‘‘political’ multiplicity which specifically entails coexisting 
entities’ (Rosenberg, 2010: 170). Yet Rosenberg’s ‘transhistorical’ reincarnation has been 
challenged vigorously by a number of contributions which claim that the concept has to be 
understood exclusively with reference to capitalism, thus is only applicable to the modern 
epoch of imperialism and capitalist development. In this section, I lay stress on the continuing 
problems related to the selective historicism and lack of substantial engagement with 
peripheral voices in the ‘modernist’ version of the U&CD. I contend that while the renewed 
U&CD literature has succeeded in tempering a ‘deafening silence’ on the non-West in 
Marxist IHS, it has not fully exhausted the potential of employing a non-Eurocentric 
methodology. 
 The critical review is concluded by briefly engaging with the ways in which Marxist 
IHS has positioned the Ottoman Empire within the world-historical expansion of capitalism, I 
refute several reductionist narratives operationalised to evaluate a ‘non-Western’ society by 
the proponents of U&CD and Political Marxism. I argue that the cursory treatment the 
Ottoman Empire receives in the literature is neither an anomaly nor a justified omission, but 
is an indicator of the scope of exteriorisation that the non-West as a whole is subjected to in 
IHS. 
 The final part of the paper re-asserts the importance of Marx’s late writings on world 
history and ethnology in which he strictly rejects crude stadial conceptions of social 
development and attempts to devise the building blocks of a theory of ‘the global 
heterogeneity of societal forms, dynamics and interdependence’ (Shanin, 1983: 6). ‘Late 
Marx’ here is positioned as a viable alternative to re-orient IHS theorising in a non-
Eurocentric formulation. I maintain that the quest to purge Marxist IHS of Eurocentrism 
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should not necessarily lead us away from historical materialism, or in Benno Teschke’s words 
‘warrant the call for methodological pluralism, the intellectual abdication to contingency, and 
the retreat to thick narrative descriptions’ (2003: 7), but should force us to rethink and 
‘reconstruct the very categories of understanding [of modernity and narratives of historical 
progress] in the process’ (Bhambra, 2007: 143 original emphasis). Such a reconstruction 
would only appear to be radically ‘non-Marxist’ (Hobson, 2011: 148) or be perceived as an 
absolute rejection of Marxist categories if ‘the ideas which Marx was nurturing at the end of 
his life—and especially at the end of the 1870s and beginning of the 1880s’ (Vitkin, 1982: 70) 
are completely overlooked. 
Frozen history of the theory of social property relations 
In what has come to be termed the ‘Brenner Debate’ Robert Brenner provided an outstanding 
combination of economic and social history with grand scale theorising which laid out the 
foundations of the social property relations approach. Brenner’s position on the origins and 
development of capitalism is a highly sophisticated reconstruction of Maurice Dobb’s (1946) 
initial formulation that the transition to capitalism was a result of the internal contradictions 
of feudalism and that class struggle was the prime mover in bringing about this radical modal 
transformation. Like Dobb, Brenner also highlights the crisis of the thirteenth century, which 
was ‘rooted in declining agricultural productivity and the population drop-off which was its 
ultimate result’ (1978: 122), as a crucial factor in the subsequent stratification between 
classes. At the end of this period of massive depopulation, feudal lords lost their ability to 
continue traditional forms of surplus appropriation and the ensuing class struggle culminated 
in the partial emancipation of the serfs (1982: 83–89). With the rise of tenant farming and the 
peasants’ ability to spend more time on their subsistence than in the lord’s demesne, the 
English peasantry became much more inclined to adopt new production techniques. The 
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landed class as well pushed similar developments in addition to employing more ‘free’ 
peasants as opposed to corvée labour. However, exactly at this juncture, Brenner argues that 
another round of class struggle was set in motion, this time as a result of manifesting class 
differentiation and ultimately of the widespread employment of wage-labourers. Unchained 
from their compulsory service to the lords and deprived from direct access to the land, many 
peasants found themselves looking for a way to earn their subsistence. Wage-labour became 
the only alternative for many of those who had not had the opportunity or connections to 
secure proprietorship. Contrasting these developments with France, Brenner posits that the 
reason for the successful ‘emergence of the classical landlord-capitalist tenant-wage labour 
structure’ (1976: 63) in England was the English state’s favourable position vis-à-vis the 
landed nobility (1976: 71). Despite the widespread peasant resistance, by the first quarter of 
the seventeenth century, the second round of class struggle had been concluded with the 
repression of the peasant revolts and the complete defeat of ‘free’ peasantry (Brenner 1976: 
62–63). Thus, Brenner concludes that, in England, the feudal aristocracy’s transformation into 
capitalist landlords was completed by 1640 and in the remainder of the modern period 
English capitalism flourished upon the pillars of its agrarian counterpart (1978: 138). 
 Brenner’s condensed yet comprehensive account of the rise of English capitalism is 
underpinned by and in turn reinforces a particular materialist theory of history. Insisting on 
the determinacy of the class struggle and relations of production (‘logic of production’) in 
creating the conditions for transition from one mode of production to another, Brenner rejects 
the demographic/ecological determinism of Malthusian historiography, the technological 
determinism of the proponents of Marx’s initial sketch in the Preface (Marx, 1987) and 
perhaps most vehemently the commercialisation model associated with Immanuel Wallerstein 
and André Gunder Frank which maintains the determinacy of exchange relations (‘logic of 
circulation’) and the pre-existence of certain capitalist social relations before the ascendancy 
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of the capitalist mode of production. Brenner’s stringent final critique rejects the idea that 
modes of production, or at least their particular elements, can be found in each other’s 
anatomy, an idea criticised by other scholars like M. L. Morris who argued that the ‘‘next’ 
mode of production is not contained in the ‘previous’ one, nor is it produced by a movement 
internal to that structure’ (1976: 308–309).  His formula, which postulates that the ‘uniquely 4
successful development of capitalism in Western Europe was determined by a class system, a 
property system, a system of surplus extraction’ (1977: 68) is rather uncomplicated, yet 
precisely because it offers a theoretical framework supported by substantial evidence, it has 
become one of the centerpieces of contemporary Marxist historiography. 
 At this juncture, it is imperative to visit James Blaut’s vitriolic assessment of 
Brenner’s account. Blaut proclaims that despite the painstakingly detailed research agenda 
underpinning Brenner’s thesis, his conceptualisation of capitalism is ahistorical, for his 
definition suggests a ‘complete and entire’ emergence of capitalism as if ‘it were a god 
descending from Olympus to govern human affairs’ (2000: 60). On the first point, Blaut 
underestimates Brenner’s punctilious empirical work in which the particular history of the 
emergence of (English) capitalism is impressively unearthed, however, his second comment is 
on the mark.  Brenner’s extensive analysis of the conditions in which initial capitalist social 5
relations were materialised in England does present a ‘complete and entire’ depiction of 
capitalism by (I) assuming an immediate transition to capitalism once capitalist relations of 
production (e.g. wage-labour, separation of the producers from the means of production) take 
root, and (II) disregarding the subsequent processes like colonialism, the slave trade and 
 This was a point made vividly by Marx as he maintained that ‘[I]n Western Europe the capitalist economic 4
order emerged from the entrails of the feudal economic order’ (1989a: 199 emphasis added). See also 
Hobsbawm’s comments in his introduction to Marx (1965: 36).
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imperialism through which capitalist expansion irreversibly altered the development 
trajectories, as well as domestic class structures of non-capitalist societies. As Brenner 
instrumentalises Marx’s abstractions exclusively through the English case, conceptual tools 
become mere projections of English class relations, property arrangements and political 
structures; rendering their application to any non-Western context highly problematic. In Alan 
Knight’s words, Brenner’s ‘strongly Anglo-centric lens’ casts a myopic theory within which 
universal categories could only offer explanatory utility vis-à-vis Western Europe, since ‘what 
works for England (if, indeed, it does) may not work for the rest of Europe, still less for the 
rest of the world’ (Knight, 2002: 197–199). Thus for Brenner, Europe, and more specifically 
Western Europe becomes the ‘the only active maker of history’ (Washbrook, 1990: 492) as 
capitalism emerges irreversibly in the sixteenth century and the rest of global social 
development takes place in a frozen history underpinned by a ‘unilinear and strictly 
endogenous causality’ (Torras, 1980: 262). 
 The difficulty of re-animating this frozen history has been addressed and, to a certain 
extent, rectified in the works of the Brennerite camp of Marxist IHS. Benno Teschke and 
Hannes Lacher have taken the lead in reconstructing a (Political) Marxist analysis of the 
international states-system, and its constitutive relationship with capitalism and modernity, by 
utilising the framework designed by Brenner. Following the theoretical premises and the 
historical narrative of the social property relations approach, Political Marxism unequivocally 
affirms that ‘[t]he constitution, operation, and transformation of international relations are 
fundamentally governed by social property relations’ (Teschke, 2003: 273). Positioned against 
both orthodox IR theorising which enforces an analytical domestic/international divide and a 
‘fundamentally ahistorical’ world-systems theory (Lacher, 2006: 52), Brenner’s discussion of 
England’s transition to capitalism turns into a theoretical background to the re-interpretation 
of the rise of ‘modern’ international politics. According to Teschke, ‘the theory of social 
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property relations’ provides better conceptual and historical instruments as it is able ‘to 
theorize the transition to modern international relations and to draw out implications for early 
modern and modern processes of state-building—and, by extension, the genesis of the 
modern European states-system’ (2003: 117). 
 As Political Marxism creates a direct association between international relations and 
‘politically instituted class relations’ (Teschke, 2003: 272), it has to explain how a specific set 
of class relations in one society can transform systemic arrangements in the international 
arena. Or in Hannes Lacher’s formulation, the pivotal question is: ‘What are the 
consequences of the capitalist reconstitution of society for . . . the dynamic of the 
international system?’ (2006: 109). According to the Brennerite framework, given that by the 
seventeenth century, only in England a political system based on capitalist sovereignty had 
emerged, it would be misleading to project the changing nature of the states as an 
international phenomenon. This observation constitutes the backbone of Teschke’s important 
argument that the Peace of Westphalia, conventionally accepted as the genesis of the modern 
states-system, did not create the modern international system as the political multiplicity in 
the seventeenth century was largely composed of absolutist states operated on ‘dynastic 
sovereignty’ and compelled by the logic of ‘geopolitical accumulation’ (Teschke, 2002; 2003: 
218). In fact, the modern international states-system, with its internal relation to capital 
mediated through nation-states, only emerged ‘after the European-wide spread of capitalism’ 
as ‘the series of European revolutions during the late 18th and 19th centuries and the ‘freeing’ 
of markets in favour of a world market’ gave birth to a new logic, replacing territorial 
accumulation with the accumulation of capital (Teschke, 2002: 37). The suggested framework 
here is extremely useful for bifurcating the nexus of capitalist development and state 
formation into two phases. An initial stage of political restructuring can be identified in the 
period from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, where the English state 
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gradually transformed itself into a capitalist sovereign while the rest of the world remained 
partitioned as ‘non-capitalist’ states. The second phase refers to the period following the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars where nation-state formation in Europe was fused with imperialism 
and colonial reconstruction of the peripheries. It is in this era the modern nation-state form 
gains universality even though the imperial formations continued to exist, albeit in 
diminishing capacities. 
 What is the effect of English state-making on the international system in between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries then? Is the continuing territorial division of sovereign 
states a residue of the existing states-system, or does the inceptive capitalist transformation of 
political organisation represent a further realignment in the states-system? Teschke, in 
conjunction with Lacher, repeatedly states that the plural territorial division is a remnant of 
the absolutist states-system, rather than an intrinsic character of capital’s political 
manifestation. The first part of the argument is a historical fact—and is also visible in the 
attempts to disassociate nation-state formation from capitalism in the works of historical 
sociologists like Theda Skocpol (1979: 22)—but the second part stems exclusively from 
Teschke’s conceptualisation of capitalist sovereignty being based on the separation of the 
economic and the political. According to Teschke, this is the differentia specifica of 
capitalism, ‘that the capital circuits of the world market can in principle function without 
infringing on political sovereignty’ (2003: 267). This abstraction is ‘in principle’ correct as 
surplus appropriation in capitalism does not require the direct intervention of a political 
authority. However, one only needs to remember that the historical expansion of capitalism 
was ‘written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire’ (Marx 1976: 875) as it was 
achieved through a set of coercive measures and maintained—both in domestic and 
international spheres—by a political will guaranteeing the survival of its core mechanisms to 
consider Teschke’s ‘principal’ differentiation merely as a theoretical vantage point that can 
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only be applied to the capitalist state ‘in its ideal average’ (Marx, 1981: 970; cf. Teschke and 
Lacher, 2007: 568). There is no reason to accept a highly formalistic and utilitarian separation 
between an ‘economistic’ conception of capitalism and the political results of its expansion, 
then conceptualise the latter as a mere externality to the capitalist mode of production itself. 
On the persistence of the ‘European political pluriverse’ (Teschke, 2003: 123), one can easily 
recognise the pre-capitalist origins of the phenomenon without analytically detaching it from 
the coeval processes of capitalist expansion and consolidation. Thus the ‘feudal’ logic of 
political accumulation does not have to be understood exclusively as an archaic feature of the 
international system, but can be conceptualised as a fundamental component of inter-state 
relations throughout the early modern period in tune with English mercantilism and early 
capitalist expansion. The ultimate difference is found not in the abolition of political 
accumulation but in its transformation by capitalism as another method of advancing the 
mechanisms of capital accumulation. In this sense, territorial pluriverse itself is absorbed by 
and integrated into capitalism rather than preserving the formal features it gained prior to and 
during the early modern era. Consequently, Teschke’s categorisation is useful to trace certain 
changes in the way in which inter-state relations were organised, but it does not explicate (I) 
how capitalism appropriated the existing logic of political accumulation, and (II) what were 
the specific positions of ‘non-capitalist’ states with regards to the changing balance of power 
in the early modern period and, subsequently, the global expansion of capitalism in the 
modern era, except for remaining passive bystanders. 
 Lacher offers a very brief discussion which could potentially rectify the lacunae in 
Teschke’s account. On the capitalist ‘internalisation of the interstate system’ he argues that, 
national restructuring of political sovereignty cannot automatically be translated into a 
‘capitalist’ international system. The latter, as he convincingly argues, cannot be realised 
before ‘the separation of politics and economics in the domestic realm has been 
#13
completed . . . that the conflicts between capital and labour have replaced (or at least 
supplanted) those between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, the monarchy, and so 
on’ (2006: 109). Furthermore, such a systemic transformation would require the ‘completion 
of these processes not just in one state, but in most states, at least those which dominate the 
international system’. Consequently, the modern international states-system cannot be seen as 
a monolithic composite created by homogeneous ‘capitalist’ states, but only through ‘a 
gradual process’ it achieves a certain uniformity dictated by a structural logic (2006: 109). 
The pitfall in Lacher’s argument is that he advances this conditionality to bolster his 
hypothesis that ‘[n]either capitalism nor absolutism gives us the modern sovereign state in its 
entirety’ (2006: 58 original emphasis). But the same argument can be turned upside down to 
posit that the modern states-system cannot be explicated through a temporally divided 
analysis but should be seen as an outcome of the interaction between different political 
structures in the early modern and modern eras. If only the intransigent foundations of 
Political Marxism are accepted a priori, a clear demarcation between the early modern and 
modern political sovereignty surfaces in a way that minimises the place of non-capitalist 
actors in the political system.  Thus it is not unsurprising that Lacher’s important question, 6
‘what sort of history can best recover the social practices that constitute the sovereign, 
territorial state . . . ?’ (2006: 15), is answered by himself in the form of underscoring the 
conjunctural features of modern European states.  7
 Compare Lacher’s position with that of Ellen Meiksins Wood who highlights ‘the close connection between 6
capitalism and the nation-state in general’ and claim that ‘capitalism developed in tandem with the process of 
state formation’ (2002a: 19).
 Teschke and Lacher (2007: 569n.4) attempt to assuage charges of Eurocentrism against Political Marxism by 7
maintaining that their perspective ‘is not Eurocentric in the sense that it assumes something inherent to the 
course of European history as a whole’. Rather, they insist on the particular significance of their ‘Anglocentrism’ 
as it underscores ‘the specificity of a regional sociopolitical transformation and the concomitant construction of 
new forms of economic and political subjectivity that would create consequences of world-historical relevance’. 
This, however, signals precisely the deficit of Political Marxim as the prioritised ‘specificity of a regional 
sociopolitical transformation’ is understood without a clear appreciation of inter-societal developments which 
facilitate, condition or even determine the trajectory of various regional socio-economic and political 
configurations.
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Uneven and combined development and the persistence of exteriorisation 
If Political Marxism remains locked within a Eurocentric ontology which effectively 
invisibilises the non-West and only registers European-induced developments as causally 
linked with systemic change, where else can we turn in Marxist IHS to locate non-Eurocentric 
theorising? The most promising extant candidate for this task is Justin Rosenberg’s work on 
the concept of uneven and combined development. Theoretically, Rosenberg’s reconstruction 
seems to transcend many of the Eurocentric pitfalls as it strives to recapture ‘the interactive 
multiplicity of social development as a historical process’ (2006: 312). Such a position 
naturally requires the rejection of homogenising universalist and essentalist theoretical 
assumptions, for the failure to do so could easily collapse ‘the interactive multiplicity’ into 
mere static units comparable to functionally identical states in neorealist IR. Furthermore, 
Rosenberg takes another step forward and recognises that all units within the international 
system interact with each other and the system dialectically, hence ‘the international’ consists 
of an ‘inner differentiation of parts, across many dimensions, but within an ontological whole’ 
(2006: 316). The ultimate task for Rosenberg is then to develop U&CD as an explanatory 
framework within which ‘dynamic and comparative moments of analysis’ can be incorporated 
within a single theoretical vantage point ‘in order to theorize a specifically inter-societal 
dimension of social change’ (2006: 312). 
 Initially sketched out by Leon Trotsky to highlight the ‘peculiar’ socio-economic 
trajectory of Russia and its potential in bringing about a socialist revolution before the 
complete domination of the capitalist mode of production, the theory recasts the essence of 
capitalist expansion as an inherently international phenomenon, which mutually enforces and 
is sustained by the combination of different social relations subjugated by the capitalist ‘laws 
of motion’. Trotsky, thus rejected the stadial interpretation of the succession of modes of 
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production and maintained that ‘backward’ countries do not necessarily follow the same steps 
the ‘advanced’ countries had taken, hence ‘a repetition of the forms of development by 
different nations is ruled out’ (Trotsky 2008: 4). 
 Trotsky’s unique contribution can be located in the addition of the term ‘combination’ 
to the previously designated concept of ‘uneven development’. While Lenin’s discussion of 
‘uneven and spasmodic development’ is concerned with the varying degrees and outcome of 
competitiveness between ‘individual enterprises, individual branches of industry and 
individual countries’ (1964: 241); Trotsky weaves an intricate web of ‘interrelationships’ with 
which capitalist expansion subsumes other social formations and combines ‘archaic’ and 
‘contemporary’ forms in line with the ‘laws of world economy’ (1969: 152). As with Lenin, 
who underlined the ‘transitional forms of state dependence’ in the peripheries (1964: 263 
original emphasis), Trotsky too saw the most explicit manifestations of the uneven and 
combined character of capitalist expansion in the peripheries’ integration to the capitalist 
world economy and in their economic and political relationship vis-à-vis the early capitalist 
states; hence his theory’s genesis in the Russian context. This relationship is established 
through the ‘whip of external necessity’, either in the form of direct coercion or by means of 
financial and economic dependency. As Neil Smith has asserted, within the condition of 
uneven and combined development, ‘[u]nevennes now primarily emanate[s] from the laws of 
capital themselves rather than from the archaeology of past social and geographical 
difference’ (2006: 186). 
 Rosenberg’s contributions (1996; 2006; 2010) have attempted to expand the content 
and applicability of the concept by positing the view that ‘the inner causal structure of 
development itself as a historical phenomenon is intrinsically both uneven and 
combined’ (2006: 333). Built on Trotsky’s transient characterisation of ‘unevenness’ as ‘the 
most general law of the historic process’ and the existence of the laws of uneven and 
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combined development ‘throughout the whole course of history’ (Trotsky, 2008: 5, 1969: 148, 
1972: 300); Rosenberg’s effort represents both a continuation of a line of theoretical 
interventions aimed at rebranding U&CD as ‘a general theory of the socio-economic 
dynamics of the historical process’ (Löwy, 1981: 87; Mandel, 1975: 23) and a novel 
endeavour to theorise a causal framework for inter-societal relations so as to reach ‘a 
sociological definition of the international’ (Rosenberg, 2006: 313). 
 In its recent reincarnation, the concept’s main strength stems from its latent receptivity 
to identify multiple trajectories and theorise the paths with which different socio-economic 
configurations have historically related to each other. U&CD thus potentially beckons the 
construction of a truly international theory, one which effectively moves beyond regionally or 
culturally bounded autocentric frameworks and ‘conceptualizes the process and outcomes of 
the interaction of diachronically simultaneous yet historically a-synchronous polities’ (Matin, 
2007: 428). Moreover, it embodies the recognition of multilinear development trajectories 
and reinforces the centrality of the international at the formulation of a general theory of 
social change. Within this formulation, ‘[e]ach instance of social change, therefore, always 
bears the marks of both the wider process of uneven and combined development in which it is 
actively entangled, as well as the effects of the more organic and localized determinations and 
features which ultimately render it analytically distinct and amenable to concrete 
analysis’ (Matin, 2013: 368). 
 As a number of recent contributions have explicitly demonstrated, the formulation of 
U&CD à la Rosenberg—or what Hobson labels ‘generalised’ conception (2011: 148)—opens 
up a highly productive avenue in which the specific question of Eurocentrism can be tackled 
with a rich conceptual toolbox. According to Hobson, the ‘generalised’ version can effectively 
avoid the pitfall of ‘fetishising Europe with the unintended consequence of naturalising, if not 
eternalising, Western capitalist domination, while simultaneously denying agency to the 
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East’ (2011: 165). Matin correspondingly maintains that U&CD, defined in these terms, offers 
‘a deeper theoretical foundation for a non-Eurocentric international historical materialism’ as 
well as ‘highlighting the constitutiveness of the international both to the emergence and the 
expansion of capitalism’ (2013: 370). 
 These methodological pointers have already been harnessed to provide historico-
theoretical exegeses in two important pre-capitalist cases, namely Iran (Matin, 2007) and the 
Ottoman Empire (Nişancıoğlu, 2013). Matin’s study positions pre-modern Iran on a particular 
axis of development in which state formation is understood as a consequence of ‘dynamic, 
internationally generated combination . . . of the nomadic and agrarian polities’ (2007: 438). 
Of note here is the extension of the parameters of state formation. By specifically 
incorporating the ‘international’ to the analysis, Matin is able to weave an analytical 
framework which is sensitive to the extant political and socio-economic relations in Iran and 
the conditioning developments which were structured through Iran’s interaction with its 
neighbours and its location in the international system. In Nişancıoğlu’s work, the 
‘international’ becomes a de-essentialised space of inter-societal reciprocity as the seemingly 
‘indirect’ impact of the Ottoman Empire on early modern Europe is reconstructed to reveal a 
historically configured causal interaction. Both investigations attest the innate non-
Eurocentric foundation of the reformulated U&CD by conceptualising long-term social and 
political change in a non-determinist structuralism which remains attentive to the specificities 
of different social formations and historically constituted interaction between them.  8
 While the deployment of U&CD as a transhistorical pattern of social development has 
proven to be an extremely valuable methodology to overcome ‘frozen histories’, the 
temporally limited conception is still susceptible to re-asserting Eurocentric claims. If the 
 Nevertheless, it should be reminded that the ontological breakthrough of the ‘generalised conception’ has so far 8
remained incomplete as its proponents have not provided comprehensive accounts of the actual agential 
processes through which ‘combination’ of social and political forms take shape. See Pozo-Martin (2007: 556); 
Rioux (2009: 590–591); Teschke (2011: 1102).
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limited position is taken, U&CD becomes an intrinsic element of the era of capitalism’s 
worldwide expansion and ‘is most usefully employed in the context of a theory of the 
capitalist mode of production, as capitalist social relations—and political forms—are 
historically unique in their systematic generation of both combination and 
unevenness’ (Ashman, 2009: 31; Davidson, 2009: 19).  Even here, the problem is not 9
necessarily the concept’s employment to explain ‘combination and unevenness’ perpetuated 
by capitalist expansion, but the way in which capitalist expansion itself is understood as a 
rather unilinear and diffusionist process. 
 My contention is that the temporally limited conceptualisation risks undermining 
Rosenberg’s main aim, namely the construction of a theory of ‘inter-societal dimension of 
social change’ as long as the entrenched Eurocentric presuppositions are left untouched. 
Unlike Political Marxism, U&CD’s Eurocentrism does not emerge directly from its 
theoretical foundation, but is rather reinforced by the proponents’ unwillingness to engage 
with peripheral social formations outside the predefined historiography of unidirectional 
capitalist development. Here, the re-interiorisation of the non-West is attempted only within 
the confines of an established modernist framework, thus even those who focus on non-
Western societies end up re-introducing Eurocentric dilemmas back into the conceptual and 
historical discussions. Put shortly, within most recent applications of U&CD, the non-West 
becomes an ‘empirical exteriority’, not an ‘ontological’ one. 
Reconfiguring the Ottoman history as a corrective lens for international 
theory 
As a litmus test, I now briefly look at the extant approaches on the transformation of the 
Ottoman tributary formation and assess whether they can fully capture the complexity of a 
 See also Smith (2006); van der Linden (2007); Morton (2011: 250–251n.1).9
#19
‘peripheral’ society’s social, economic and political reorganisation both in domestic and 
international levels. The selection of the Ottoman Empire is not accidental. Due to its long-
lasting influence and direct involvement in as well as its geographical proximity to Europe, 
the Ottoman Empire can be identified as ‘the dominant Other in the history of the European 
states system’ (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 330). As a particularly relevant example of the 
peripheral expansion of capitalism and imperialist geopolitics of the 19th century 
(comparable, perhaps only to Russia), the Ottoman Empire represents significant 
opportunities to scrutinise and substantiate theoretical propositions advanced by Marxist IHS. 
Moreover, its peculiar location in the literature, marked by either a curious absence or a 
contradictory presence, reveals the extent to which the approaches in question are ill-
equipped or reluctant to engage with the non-West. Nevertheless, it is equally important to 
note that its specific treatment in the literature should be contextualised as part of a broader 
pattern in which a large portion of the IHS scholarship continually overlooks, subordinates or 
devalorises the experience of the non-Western societies. 
 In its first incarnation within the literature, the Ottoman Empire is represented 
essentially as an absent power in international politics. Despite the immediate centrality of the 
Ottoman-Christian (i.e. European) relationship in the formation of the early modern political 
system, we only find two passing references to the Ottomans in Teschke’s The Myth of 1648
—the definitive IHS reconstruction of the era. This is a significant non-inclusion that cannot 
be justified by outlining the boundaries of the book as ‘the genesis of the modern European 
states-system’ (Teschke, 2003: 117 emphasis added). ‘Throughout nearly 600 years of its 
history, the Ottoman state was as much a part of the European political order as were its 
French or Habsburg rivals’ (Quataert, 2005: 2–3), yet beyond such descriptive 
categorisations, the Ottoman interaction with the European states during the early modern 
period marked a causal configuration in which both the individual states and the states-system 
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in general were correspondingly affected. Explicit manifestations of such reciprocity can be 
observed in the period of Franco-Ottoman Alliance (16–19th c.) or in the Ottoman-Habsburg 
struggle which directly influenced the Atlantic expansion of the European maritime powers 
through the Ottoman control of Egypt and Syria (Jensen, 1985; Hess, 1973). 
 In the second incarnation, the Ottoman Empire emerges as a ‘pre-modern’ or ‘archaic’ 
state, locked in an immobile and lethargic non-history, only to be ‘penetrated’ by Western 
capitalist powers (cf. Wallerstein, 1979: 398). Here, the deceptive image of the Ottoman 
Empire as the ‘sick man of Europe’ finds strong resonance among the proponents of both 
Political Marxism and U&CD. More critically, perfunctory appropriation of the propositions 
of a heavily disputed ‘decline paradigm’—which maintains a perennial and inevitable 
withering of the Ottoman state from the late 16th to the early 20th century—undermines the 
validity of historical evidence on which the analytical frameworks are built.  Accordingly, 10
many of the existing IHS accounts rely extensively on a narrative, in which European 
capitalism instantaneously and irreversibly transforms the empire, seemingly without any 
form of intervention by or interaction with domestic actors, conditions and structures. 
Correspondingly, internal changes in the socio-economic arrangements of the empire are also 
positioned as strictly exogenous affairs, whereby the Ottomans are effectively stripped off of 
any active agency. Operating on the temporally limited version of U&CD, ‘Turkey’ claims 
Neil Davidson, ‘under pressure from the Western powers, [was] forced for reasons of military 
competition to introduce limited industrialization and partial agrarian reform’ (2009: 14). A 
relatively more precise U&CD reading is sketched out in a recent contribution as follows: 
Once the capitalist ball was rolling, after the late 18th and early 19th centuries the Ottomans were 
forced to attempt to restructure along the lines of a ‘rational’ European state . . . However, the 
Ottoman attempts to regularize administration and revenue necessarily clashed with the tax farming 
 For examinations and critiques of the decline paradigm, see Howard (1988); Salzmann (1993); 10
Karaömerlioğlu (2002); Quataert (2003).
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and tribute taking social structures on which the empire had hitherto relied . . . The resulting crises 
and centrifugal pressures not only provided the opportunity for Western powers to grab parts of the 
Empire, but also created the conditions in which the ‘Young Turks’ of the Committee for Unity and 
Progress [sic] came to power . . . The case of the Ottoman Empire thus represents a particularly stark 
contrast between pre-capitalist and capitalist inter-societal relations. (Allinson and Anievas, 2010: 
210) 
The transformation of the Ottoman polity here is perceived as a unidirectional process which 
was exclusively imposed upon the empire by the capitalist West (assumed as an already-
constituted entity), thus overlooks the instances of active agency within the empire. 
Correspondingly, the then ongoing sub-global and local level negotiations of the existing 
social, economic and political structures appear as exclusively imitative of the West or 
contingent on the incursion of imperialism. Accepting the formalistic framework offered by 
such analyses—which is designed purely to differentiate the modalities of capitalist and non-
capitalist compulsion for social change—projects an entirely exogenous political and 
economic development in and a unilinear interaction of capitalist powers with the Ottoman 
Empire. The resulting picture vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire is a repetition of the Eurocentric 
arguments originally developed by European dominated historiography and IR, hence instead 
of recovering peripheral voices, the application of U&CD ‘erases the real subjects of history: 
those who actually make it and from which any concept of development must arise’ (Rioux, 
2009: 590). 
 On the Political Marxist spectrum, a conditional agency is granted but the strict 
periodisation and classification between ‘pre-capitalist’ and ‘capitalist’ states based on 
‘Anglocentric’, hence non-corresponding (see İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 105–106, 404–405n.2) 
property relations render the 19th century Ottoman polity an inherently stagnant social 
formation, devoid of endogenous movement for change. Even when the internal 
reconfigurations are recognised, they are only interpreted as consequences of the ‘Eastern 
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Question’, thus as mere ramifications of the great power imperialism in the Balkans and the 
Middle East. The geopolitical calculation surrounding the survival of the imperial territorial 
integrity in the form of the ‘Eastern Question’ dismisses ‘the actual structure and dynamics of 
Ottoman society’ and further blocks the theorising of the emergent Turkish state form. This is 
accompanied by another round of exclusion as ‘the Eastern Question is portrayed either as a 
European response to a purely degenerative and internally driven Ottoman decline, or as the 
safety-valve for the pressures emanating from the European balance of power’ (Bromley, 
1994: 48, 99). Interpretation of Tanzimat as a type of defensive modernisation (Shilliam, 
2006: 382) is especially striking and indicative of non-engagement with the broader currents 
of historiography as many studies have conclusively revealed that the ‘Tanzimat period 
cannot be considered simply as a phase of the Eastern Question, and examined from the 
outside looking in’ (Davison, 1963: 8; Brown, 1984: 39). 
 Further illustrating the limits of Political Marxism, Clemens Hoffmann claims that the 
19th century centralisation was merely an attempt by the central government to retain its own 
power: ‘[W]hat seems to be raison d’état on the surface remained raison de prince or rather 
raison de sultan applying new modern methods’ (2008: 385). Hence, instead of providing 
legal, political and economic frameworks within which capitalist social relations could take 
root or be nurtured, the reforms were understood to be caused by and aimed at the 
continuation of pre-capitalist social forces in the empire. This is a common theme that unites 
both Political Marxism and U&CD in their engagement with the non-West, as either ‘the 
international’ is excessively prioritised or national/sub-national levels are inadequately 
incorporated into causal explanations. The ‘whip of external necessity’ itself is understood to 
be only handled by European capitalists which further problematises the examination of 
Ottoman international relations vis-à-vis other ‘pre-capitalist’ actors such as Russia. More 
significantly, both approaches ignore crucial strains in Ottoman social and economic history 
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that have revealed how (I) non-tributary social relations had begun permeating agricultural 
production and class relations as early as the 17th century (Kasaba 1987; 1988; Salzmann, 
1994; Reyhan, 2008), (II) the cultivators’ struggles affected the central administration’s 
economic policies as well as the re-organisation of the property and landholding 
arrangements (Abou-El-Haj, 2005; Aytekin, 2012), and (III) the subsequent reform 
movements themselves were shaped, to a certain degree, by social forces from below 
(Emiroğlu, 1999) as opposed to a reductionist, exclusively top-down narrative. 
 An empirically stronger, and theoretically non-reductionist reading of the nineteenth 
century Ottoman trajectory with particular reference to capitalist development, state 
transformation and imperialist geopolitics can be constructed in dialogue with the Ottoman 
historiography. Instead of resorting to analytically deficient and empirically unsustainable 
forms of periodisation and classification advanced by the extant Marxist IHS approaches, 
materialist frameworks have to dig deeper and retrace the processes with which the 
underlying structures of the Ottoman social formation were transformed over the early 
modern period (Abou-El-Haj, 2005; Tezcan, 2010). Nişancıoğlu’s recent contribution 
succeeds in fulfilling this promise though his utilisation of the ‘generalised’ conception of 
U&CD still leaves room for a broader examination of the domestic sources of modal change 
that affected the Ottoman trajectory. Engaging with the processes through which ‘internal’ 
modal structures are transformed vis-à-vis international developments reveals that while the 
imminent confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and imperialist Europe took its most 
acute form in the nineteenth century following the spread of expansionary waves of 
capitalism, the Ottoman social formation had undergone an important, yet limited 
transformation in the previous two centuries. It is in this period the tributary social relations 
were initially challenged by incipient social forces, engendered by externally induced and 
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internally mediated factors ranging from the 16th century Price Revolution to the abolition of 
tımar system and its gradual replacement with tax-farming.  
 Initially, tax-farming was implemented as a short term measure to enhance the 
empire’s fiscal balance as the prolonged military campaigns and peasant revolts overstrained 
the Porte’s budget. Gradual expansion of tax-farming coincided with the changes in military 
organisation; the imperial army had become more dependent on the salaried janissary corps 
rather than the cavalry ranks sustained by the tımar system. Ömer Lütfi Barkan registers an 
early instance of this shift by noting that ‘[d]uring the period 1528–1670, the Janissary 
numbers increased seven times, [whereas] the Sipahi numbers [increased] three times’ (1975: 
19). According to İnalcık, the janissary numbers increased from 13,000 to 38,000 from circa 
1550 to the 1600s (1980: 289). The main shift from the light cavalry to the armored infantry 
was also a reflection of the changes in European military technology. By the end of the 
seventeenth century, Ottomans had become acutely aware of and increasingly interested in the 
renewed military capacity of their western neighbours. While the refashioned Ottoman army 
maintained its coercive superiority until the last quarter of the seventeenth century, tax-
farming and the invalidation of central control on the agricultural production resulted in a 
more substantial transformation in the long run. As Mustafa Akdağ has put it bluntly, ‘by the 
seventeenth century the foundation of the empire were not the landed sipahis anymore’ (1945: 
423). 
 The following two centuries were marked by the gradual dissolution of the core 
tributary mechanisms. Provincial notables (ayans) and commercial intermediaries gained 
more influence through the control of land and production, as ‘[b]y the eighteenth century the 
applicability of tax farming had ceased to be restricted to the crown lands and was extended 
to cover all kinds of holdings’ (Kasaba 1987: 808). In the eighteenth century, ayans 
effectively assumed the role of tax collectors (muhassıl) in the provinces while the central 
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administration had become increasingly reliant on the notables ‘for the collection of taxes, 
maintenance of order, and the raising of auxiliary troops’ (Kasaba 1987: 812). The further 
deterioration of the imperial economy and military capacity in the eighteenth century created 
more space for the ayans and intermediaries to position themselves as ‘de facto owners of 
fairly large estates by repeatedly purchasing farming privileges’ by means of ‘conversion of 
tax farms into property-like holdings by acquiring life-long deeds or leases, by establishing 
pious foundations, or by using force’ (Kasaba 1987: 808–809). ‘Experimentation with 
revenue extraction reached its peak in the eighteenth century with the extensive practice of 
mülk grants, which converted public lands outright into registered private property’ (Abou-El-
Haj 2005: 16). According to one source, ‘[b]y the eighteenth century, a substantial portion of 
state-owned (mirî) land that had been distributed as tımars had in effect become private 
land’ (Hanioğlu 2008: 21). In a very elementary sense, tax farms became the forerunners of 
mass-scale legally guaranteed private property and production system, even though they 
remained firmly entrenched within the political boundaries of the tributary formation. 
 Thus, contra Allinson and Anievas, ‘the capitalist ball’ did not flatten the tributary 
state by enforcing structural reforms and a market economy consistent with the global 
expansion of European capitalism; but the ultimate restructuring of the Ottoman social 
formation was mediated through interminable struggles among and within social groups 
occupying sites of production and reproduction in the empire. The ‘factors specific to 
capitalism’ had become not that ‘alien’ at all in these two centuries (Wood 2002b: 56), as 
prebendal production was replaced by de facto private estates controlled by provincial 
notables and other intermediaries. Methodologically, this exposition underscores the 
importance of exploring parallel spaces of international and local (agential) interaction 
without eschewing the construction of causal linkages or prioritising one socio-spatial unit of 
analysis over another. 
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Reclaiming Marx and the ‘global heterogeneity of societal forms’ 
The hitherto provided account portrays a grim outlook for the prospects of a non-Eurocentric 
Marxist IHS, but the limitations of the extant approaches do not necessarily signify the 
exhaustion of the repository of historical materialism. The question is, can Marxist IHS offer 
a truly universal perspective without exposing its subjects to a narrow homogeneity and 
imprinting the mark of a European-induced teleology on social development? By offering a 
brief discussion of a ‘non-Eurocentric’ reading of Marx, I aim to craft one possible 
alternative. 
 A recent wave in Marxist social theory has produced strong counter-arguments against 
Marx’s Eurocentrism and attempted to absolve certain tenets of historical materialism of its 
own Eurocentric and provincialist variations.  Here, the initial textual reading of Marx is 11
built upon his various discussions on pre-capitalist societies, the emergence of capitalism in 
Europe and the evolution of his general theory of history in the Grundrisse and Capital. 
Equally important, however, is the renewed focus on some of Marx’s less analysed material, 
including his ‘Ethnological Notebooks’ (Marx, 1972), notebooks on world history, and letters 
and exchanges he penned down from the mid-1870s to 1882. The first and foremost lesson to 
be drawn from these writings is that Marx explicitly rejected any unilateral trajectory of 
historical social development, refuting, in the process, the myth that his theory of history is 
‘an account of history whose teleology was always directed towards an inexorable 
closure’ (Young, 1990: 6). In response to his critics who read Marx’s theory as a uniformative 
universalisation of a particular European experience, he warned against ‘[metamorphosing 
his] historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-
philosophic theory of general development, imposed by fate on all peoples, whatever the 
 See Anderson (2010); Banaji (2010); Brown (2010); Lindner (2010).11
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historical circumstances in which they are placed’ (Marx, 1989a: 200). Precisely because 
there is no ‘formula of a general historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists 
in being supra-historical’ (Marx, 1989a: 201), Marx’s theorising of capitalist development—
starting from the tracing of its most concrete components to the creation of universal 
abstractions which generate general conceptual frameworks in which different manifestations 
can be examined—naturally assumes a polychromatic picture of global development. 
 The question of difference is highlighted in a much more pronounced manner in his 
letter to Russian populist Vera Zasulich. Outlining his depiction of the genesis of the capitalist 
mode of production in Western Europe, Marx quotes from Capital that ‘the metamorphosis of 
feudal production into capital production’ was engendered by ‘the expropriation of the 
agricultural producer’ and that ‘all other countries of Western Europe are undergoing the 
same process’; yet he quickly underscores that he ‘expressly limited this ‘historical 
inevitability’ to the ‘countries of Western Europe’’ (Marx, 1989b: 360; 1989c: 370; 1976: 876 
original emphasis). While the Marx-Zasulich exchange revolves around the issue of Russia’s 
‘uneven and combined’ transition to capitalism, Marx’s broader point about the ‘multilinear 
character of historical development’ (Vitkin, 1982: 63) had long been a part of his overall 
theory. The evidence to this claim, within the strictly European context, can be given from 
Marx’s delineation of commercial capital as ‘a historical precondition for the development of 
the capitalist mode of production’ (1981: 444), which then led Marx to advance that 
‘capitalist production developed earliest’ in Italian city-states (1976: 876) and to further 
denominate Holland as ‘the model capitalist nation of the seventeenth century’ (1976: 916). 
 Perhaps more significantly, Marx forcefully opposed a common feature of much 
contemporary Marxist IHS theorising, namely the transferral of socio-historical categories 
from one society to another without substantially engaging with the social, economic and 
political histories of the recipients. Illustratively, in his vivid discussion of Maxim 
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Kovalevsky’s Communal Landownership, Marx scathingly highlights how Kovalevsky, 
making a verbatim comparison with Western European structures, misinterpreted India as a 
feudal society (Marx, 1975). This is also one of the most grossly misunderstood aspects of the 
whole debate on the Asiatic mode of production, wherein Marx’s conception was constructed 
not as a materialist reworking of the Eurocentric concept of ‘Oriental Despotism’, but as an 
attempt to capture the paths of divergence among different societies based on their production 
relations. What is missing in many Marxist critiques of the Asiatic mode of production, such 
as the one spearheaded by Perry Anderson (1974: 462–549), is an appreciation of the 
‘heterogeneity of Marx’s conception of the East’ (Vitkin, 1982: 65). Where Anderson’s 
critique simply renders non-Western formations like the Ottoman Empire ‘a kind of backdrop 
to the unfolding drama of world history, which in his view is equated with the history of the 
principal European states’ (Abou-El-Haj, 2005: 4), Marx’s horizon was approaching a much 
deeper understanding of ‘multidirectionality . . . [a] world of mutual dependence, indeed, of 
heterogeneity resulting from that very interdependence’ (Shanin, 1983: 31). 
 In short, ‘Late Marx’ offers a distinct methodology capable of theorising inter-societal 
unity and a rich spectrum of non-autocentric conceptions of social change and development. 
While some of these rehabilitative proposals to counteract the deep-rooted Eurocentrism of 
the discipline are found in a fragmentary and scattered manner in Marx’s writings, they 
unequivocally underline that Marx took important steps towards the re-interiorisation of the 
non-West into historical materialism. Given the wealth of historical evidence and research 
available to the scholars today, compiling and reconstructing the missing pieces in Marx’s 
puzzle should be welcomed as an essential task with which to formulate an international 
theory that ‘systematically incorporates the causal significance of [societies’] asynchronous 
interaction . . . into an explanation of their individual and collective development and change 
over time’ (Rosenberg, 2006: 335). 
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Conclusion 
The genealogy of IR theorising reveals repeated attempts at conceptualising the ways in 
which internally varied political actors constitute a coherent international system and at 
explaining how and why such actors—the boundaries of which are drawn along the lines of 
territory, political organisation, culture and economy—can and do coexist within such 
systems. From the English School’s normative international institutionalism to the most 
recent attempts at rebranding inter-societal relations as a determining causality in the form of 
‘the international’, historically oriented theorising of the international system has always 
promised to offer a universal perspective. With hindsight, one can easily share Teschke’s 
sentiment that ‘[t]he historical turn in IR has helped break out of the state-centric straitjacket 
of orthodox IR’ (2003: 271), yet ahistorical state-centrism has not been the only impediment 
along the construction of a non-diffusionist, non-autocentric international theory. 
 As I have outlined in this paper, the Eurocentric straitjacket still prevents even the 
most auspicious efforts from embracing a radically global ontology, within which the 
historical routes of socio-economic development are understood as the outcome of reciprocal 
interaction between spatially and temporally variegated units. Despite their often 
incompatible claims on the correct level of abstraction, the specific periodisation of the 
development of capitalism and the form and utility of capitalist sovereignty, there are two 
threads that draw together competing historical materialist approaches as exemplified by 
Political Marxism and the ‘modernist’ version of U&CD: (I) An unyielding claim to provide 
an exhaustive theorising of the ‘international’, (II) An unmissable exclusivity on the 
European end of the international states-system in which the political adjustments in the rest 
of the world are either completely ignored or are only taken into account if there is a direct 
relation to their Western counterparts. Thus the celebrated attempt to underscore ‘inter-
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societal’ relations and to position them as a constitutive aspect of the ‘international’ system 
succeeds only to the extent that ‘inter-societal’ is understood as ‘between European societies’ 
and the ‘international’ devolves into ‘intra-European relations’ (Hobson, 2009: 674; 2011: 
152). While recognising the pivotal restructuring of sovereignty in capitalist formations as the 
separation of political and economic spheres, none of these accounts substantially examine 
the differentiated and/or preserved forms of absolutist or the so-called parcellised forms of 
sovereignty in coeval non-capitalist societies. A direct consequence of this unipolarity is the 
elevation of a strictly regional phenomenon (restructuring of European sovereignty with the 
emergence of capitalist social forces and the consequent alteration of the wider European 
states-system) to a general theory of capitalist state and international states-system. 
Formulation of such a theory, inadvertently or not, suggests a particularly universalised 
accommodation of and transition to a political structure marked by capitalist sovereignty. The 
rise of the modern European state, with its path dependent social transformation, effortlessly 
becomes the foundation of a European states-system composed of more or less similarly 
structured former absolutist states which had remodeled themselves through bourgeois 
revolutions, political revolutions from above or simply through the collapse of the former 
social order from within. This Eurocentric international theory, however, does not, and more 
importantly cannot, account for the variegated trajectories of state formation outside Europe 
as they neither conform to the predefined paths of social and political reorganisation nor are 
deemed part of the ‘international’ system from which the general theory emerges. By the 
same token, it does not recognise the role of non-European states in the constitution of the 
European states-system, let alone their constant interaction in the composition of an 
international political multiplicity. 
 Within the boundaries of Marxist IHS, a non-Eurocentric reconfiguration can be 
undertaken with a view to conceptualising the longue durée of the development of capitalism 
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and modern states-system as an instance of ‘connected histories’, the nature of which can be 
unearthed ‘not by comparison alone, but by seeking out the at times fragile threads that 
connected the globe’ (Subrahmanyam, 1997: 761–762). In this case, these ‘fragile threads’ 
reveal themselves as social relations that spanned across the world, bridged different spatial 
scales from local to global, and most importantly encompassed a high degree of 
corresponding influence between and synchronicity in the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’. Instead of 
resorting to completely new methodological frameworks to overcome the inherent questions 
of Eurocentrism and provincialism, I maintain that a re-reading of Marx’s writings on both 
the development of capitalism in Western Europe and non-Western societies could 
provisionally provide a way out of the ‘Eurocentric cul-de-sac’ which continues to dominate 
the conceptual discussions in the literature (Hobson, 2011: 148). It could do so by following 
the ‘spirit of Marx’ (Dussel, 2001: 14) in advancing a universal (but not homogenising) 
historical-theoretical framework which remains attentive to different social, political and 
economic conditions constituted along the axis of varying temporal and spatial 
configurations. This endeavour, however, should not be undertaken in isolation, but requires 
substantial engagement with the growing global history and postcolonial literatures. Most 
importantly, it necessitates a genuine effort to enter a dialogue with the peripheral voices and 
histories, not so much as to ‘fit’ their realities into pre-ordained frameworks but to understand 
and position them as parts of a truly ‘international’ system in which they operate.  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